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ABSTRACT 
Section 1206 of the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act established a new 
program giving DOD the authority to spend up to $200M to train and equip foreign 
militaries to undertake counterterrorism or stability operations.  This is the first major 
DOD authority for training and equipping other military forces.  DOD previously trained 
and equipped foreign military forces through State Department programs considered 
cumbersome and ineffective.  In FY2006, DOD and the State Department were given 
about $100 million for nine projects involving 15 countries, projects directed, 
administered and supervised by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.  In some 
cases, Section 1206 has proven effective in countering terrorist activity in countries 
receiving assistance.  Opponents of the policy argue that it inappropriately gives DOD 
power to affect foreign policy.  In the last three years, DOD has bypassed State 
Department approval on some projects that may have been in the interest of national 
security but not foreign policy.  Opponents of the policy want assurance that DOD is held 
accountable for how they implement Section 1206 and that Section 1206 projects are in 
accordance with U.S. foreign policy.  However, when terrorists hide among the local 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A BACKGROUND 
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 
gave the President authority to spend DOD funding to build the partnership security 
capacity of foreign military and security forces.  Section 1206 was to be used by the 
DOD to better respond to certain urgent needs and emerging threats.1 
Section 1206, commonly referred to as Global Train and Equip Authority, 
provides the President the authority to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or 
support programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces to perform 
counterterrorism operations or to participate in or support military and stability 
operations in which U.S. armed forces participate.2 
Section 1206 authorizes funding to be used for training, supplies and equipment 
and is funded within the DOD operations and maintenance account.  Section 1206 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 is significant because it is the 
first major DOD authority to be used expressly to train other military forces.3   
Section 1206 funding has become a somewhat controversial DOD foreign 
assistance program.  Many believe that Section 1206 gives the DOD too much power, 
and that the authority should lie within the State Department.  One argument states that 
Section 1206 has only dealt with a few isolated emergency requirements, and that most of 
the funding has been used for projects that could have been supported via the normal 
budget process for State funded security assistance programs.4  Another issue with 
 
1 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:  Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.  August 25, 2008.  p. 73. 
2 Ibid., p.74. 
3 Nina M. Serafino, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006:  A Fact 
Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces.  CRS Report for 
Congress.  June 3, 2008.  p. 1. 
4  Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:  Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.  August 25, 2008.  p. 76. 
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Section 1206 is that private contractors are primarily used to conduct the training.  
Analysts question why the program rests with the DOD if U.S. troops are not actually 
conducting the training.  However, the main argument against Section 1206 is that it is a 
step toward the militarization of civilian authority, arguing that it gives the DOD the 
power to affect foreign policy.5   
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Scope 
The primary objective of this thesis is to identify the policy and implementation 
issues surrounding Section 1206.  In addition, I will also discuss the policy objectives of 
Section 1206, its legislative evolution, the key players involved, and the impact that it has 
had globally. 
2. Methodology 
To address the objective of this thesis, I studied the legislation that gave rise to 
and subsequently modified Section 1206 in the House and Senate defense authorization 
bills for FY2006, 2007, and 2009.  I also reviewed reports for Congress, testimony to 
Congress and Government Accountability Office reports.  In addition, I researched many 
news articles and governmental reports that address the topic of Global Train and Equip 
Authority.  
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
To address Section 1206, I first reviewed the State Department programs that 
preceded Global Train and Equip Authority.  These programs laid the foundation for 
Section 1206, but were also the reason the authority was created.  The next topic 
discussed the flexibility of Section 1206 compared to the State Department programs. 
 
 
5 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:  Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.  August 25, 2008.  p. 77. 
  3
Section 1206 was created to fill the gaps of its predecessor programs.  To round off the 
first section, the legislation that established Section 1206 of the FY2006 National 
Defense Authorization Act was discussed. 
The next section of the thesis discusses the process of Section 1206.  It examines 
what agencies are involved with the authority and how they interact.  Testimony by the 
Commander of U.S. European Command and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is 
presented discussing the authority’s values to global security. 
The third section of the thesis will examine the issues raised by opponents of 
Global Train and Equip Authority.  Section 1206 receives opposition because it is the 
first major DOD program that is authorized to conduct security assistance.  Testimony by 
Dr. Gordon Adams of American University and a Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
report examine the authority and discuss legislative and implementation issues. 
The next section of the thesis discusses the legislative evolution of Section 1206.  
The section begins with testimony by the Secretary of Defense discussing the positive 
elements of the authority and asking Congress to make the authority permanent and more 
robust.  The section also examines the modifications in the legislation in the FY2007 and 
FY2009 defense authorization bills. 
The last section of the thesis details the ground-level impact that Section 1206 has 
had.  Four specific projects were chosen—Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, and São Tome and 
Principe—and examined by the types of materials they were granted and the impact it 
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II. THE NEED FOR SECTION 1206 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To understand why Section 1206 is needed, it is important to first understand the 
environment that was in play prior to its existence.  During the Cold War, the U.S. put in 
place programs led by the State Department to help build partners and train foreign 
forces.  These programs, still in place today, take years from inception to execution.  In 
that era and until September 11, 2001, the long lead time was not as important as it 
became after 9/11.   
In the post September 11, 2001 world, the ability to respond to emergent threats 
quickly became very important.  Section 1206 allows the State Department and DOD to 
cooperate and put into action Global Train and Equip initiatives in a relatively short 
period of time.  Global Train and Equip Authority helps build foreign partner capacity, 
which is critical to U.S. security.  Building foreign partner capacity reduces stress on U.S. 
forces by training foreign forces to handle conflicts on their own, which may prevent 
U.S. military interventions in the future.  Also, foreign forces can be more effective in 
their own country than U.S. forces, because they have a deeper understanding of the 
language and culture.  The U.S. military does not have the reach to deny terrorists 
sanctuary everywhere in the world, so building partners helps deny terrorists areas to 
work.  Also, terrorists occupy spaces in many countries with which the U.S. is at peace, 
so it is vital that the U.S. work with these countries to reduce terrorist safe havens.6 
Global Train and Equip Authority is considered by Combatant Commanders to be 
the single most important tool for building partner operational capacity, shaping the 
environment and countering terrorism outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.7         
 
6 DOD FY 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification.  February 4, 2008. p. 101. 
7 Ibid., p. 102. 
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B. OVERVIEW OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S FOREIGN MILITARY 
SALES AND FINANCING PROGRAM 
U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is the principle vehicle through which the U.S. 
government makes sales of weapons and associated equipment and training to friendly 
foreign nations.8  Basically, a purchasing country enters into a contract specifying the 
price to be paid for the military equipment being obtained.  The U.S. government then 
procures the items from a U.S. manufacturer and pays the manufacturer with the payment 
from the purchasing country.  Foreign Military Financing (FMF) permits loans or 
forgiven payments to countries that may have problems paying for needed weapons and 
military equipment.9 
The annual budget justification for FMS and FMF is formulated primarily by the 
State Department, with specific input on specific country accounts provided by the DOD.  
DOD handles the implementation of the FMS cash and credit.10  
The State Department has the primary responsibility of determining which nations 
are to receive assistance based on national policy.  The Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) specifies which conditions must be met for a country to be eligible to purchase 
defense articles from the United States.  The President also determines a country’s 
eligibility based on national security interests.  Also, countries that enter into a contract 
give binding commitments to use the articles for self defense and are not allowed to sell 
items to third parties without the consent of the U.S. government.11 
The responsibility of for implementing FMS programs rest with the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  The DSCA Security Assistance Officers who 
manage the programs on the ground are located in the U.S. embassies.12   
 
8 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:  Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.  August 25, 2008.  p. 53.   
9 Ibid., p. 53. 
10 Ibid., p. 53.  
11 Ibid., p. 53.  
12 Ibid., p. 54. 
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1. Origins and Evolution of FMS and FMF    
FMS began during the Cold War, primarily to help the allies of the U.S. rebuild 
their military defenses after World War II.  The U.S. had three core rationales for military 
assistance: 
 To enhance the ability of allied and friendly countries to defend themselves 
against external aggression or internal subversion by Communist or unfriendly 
forces. 
 To enhance bilateral security relationships to deter aggression against allied and 
friendly nations. 
 To express tangible U.S. support for political actions of allied and friendly nations 
that the United States sought to encourage.13 
Over time, our European allies grew stronger and they stopped receiving military 
aid and started paying cash for major weapons systems through FMS.  Since the Cold 
War, FMS and FMF have been instrumental in supporting U.S. national security interests. 
When FMS began, only the more industrialized allies of the United States 
participated in it, while the Military Assistance Program (predecessor to FMF) gave aid 
to the less affluent countries.  Most of the countries that used to receive aid now pay cash 
for military purchases, which include Turkey, Greece, South Korea, the Philippines and 
Taiwan.14 
Today, the principle goals of FMS remain the same, but the number of purchasing 
countries has increased.  This increase has been significant in Middle Eastern countries, 




13 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:  Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.  August 25, 2008.  p. 54.   
14 Ibid., p. 54. 
15 Ibid., p. 55. 
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The primary countries to receive FMF in the last thirty years are Egypt and Israel.  
In FY2006, Egypt and Israel received approximately $1.3 billion and $2.3 billion, 
respectively.  Additionally, both countries had their repayments waived by the U.S. 
government.16 
2. Issues 
There have not been any significant problems with the management of FMS or 
FMF between the State Department and DOD over the years.  The delineation of 
responsibility and authority is clear, and implementation has generally worked smoothly.  
Both departments would agree that more funding is necessary to provide articles to 
countries with limited financial resources.17 
In the past few years, DOD has argued that FMS/FMF lack the flexibility to 
respond to rapidly changing environments.  An FY2009 budget document stated that 
traditional security assistance (including FMS/FMF) takes three to four years from 
concept to execution.18  DOD indicates that this lead time is too long to meet emerging 
threats. 
C. OVERVIEW OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM   
 The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) falls under 
the policy authority of the State Department and is implemented by the DOD through the 
DSCA.  IMET provides opportunities for foreign military personnel to attend a variety of 
U.S. military educational institutions and training courses.  The policy decisions 
regarding which countries will be eligible for IMET programs lie primarily with the State 
Department, with input from the DOD.19 
 
16 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.  August 25, 2008.  p. 55. 
17 Ibid., p. 55. 
18 Ibid., p. 55. 
19 Ibid., p. 56. 
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1. Origins and Evolution 
IMET was formed as an outgrowth of the Military Assistance Program, and was 
to provide exclusively for various forms of military training to friendly foreign nations.  
In 1990, the changing political-military environment warranted a new direction for the 
traditional IMET program.  Congress noted that there was a need for a program to bring 
an increased emphasis on enhancing the skills and professionalism of civilian and 
military leaders of foreign nations.  Therefore, Expanded IMET (E-IMET) was formed.  
E-IMET was focused on training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and 
administering military establishments and budgets; creating and maintaining effective 
military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of 
internationally recognized human rights; and fostering greater respect for the principle of 
civilian control of the military.20  
2. Activities 
The IMET program funds a variety of training programs conducted by the DOD.  
These include the various war colleges in the DOD that focus on national security policy 
and the politico-military aspects of defense policies and programs.  Another major 
category of IMET is the professional military education sector.  There are numerous 
courses available for professional military education.  Some of these are the U.S. Army 
Infantry School, the Air Force Institute of Technology and the service command and staff 
colleges.  E-IMET also offers courses in the United States.  These include the Defense 
Resource Management Institute, the Center for Civil-Military Relations and the Naval 
Justice School.21   
3. Issues 
As with FMS/FMF, there have not been any significant problems between the 
State Department and DOD over the division of management tasks associated with 
 
20 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:  Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.  August 25, 2008.  p. 56. 
21 Ibid. p., 58. 
  10
                                                
IMET.  Again, there is a clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities, and 
implementation has worked smoothly.  However, the DOD argued that IMET—as with 
FMS/FMF—lacks the flexibility to respond to rapidly changing environments.22 
D. FLEXIBILITY OF SECTION 1206 
Because FMS/FMF and IMET were created during the Cold War, they are not an 
optimal fit for the current operational environment.  Traditional security assistance—
FMS/FMF and IMET—takes between three and four years from concept to execution.  
Global Train and Equip Authority allow a response to urgent and emergent threats or 
opportunities in six months or less.23   
Under traditional security assistance programs, a country receives roughly the 
same amount of assistance from year to year, unless there are new needs and changes to 
the strategic environment.  However, FMS/FMF and IMET are not efficient in reacting to 
emergent requirements.  With Global Train and Equip programs, countries must compete 
for funds and priority goes to the countries with the highest security interests to the U.S.  
Therefore, there is no entitlement that countries receive any funding, so competitiveness 
drives flexibility as well.24   
E. LEGISLATIVE ORIGIN 
In 2005, as part of its FY2006 budget submission, DOD requested Global Train 
and Equip Authority.25  Neither the House nor the Senate had provided for Global Train 
and Equip Authority in the original bills passed by their respective Armed Services 
Committees.  However, Senator Inhofe, the second ranking member of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, proposed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act 
 
 
22 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:  Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.  August 25, 2008.  p. 58. 
23 DOD FY 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification.  February 4, 2008. p. 103. 
24 Ibid., p. 103.  
25 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance:  Background, Major 
Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.  August 25, 2008.  p. 73.   
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for FY2006 for “military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy” for “building the 
partnership security capacity of foreign military and security forces.”26 
The amendment to the bill gave the President the authority to build the capacity of 
partner nations to “disrupt or destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, or participate 
in or support United States, coalition, or international military or stability operations.”27  
The President was allowed to provide equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding 
to support the capacity building process.  The amendment called for $750 million per 
fiscal year to fund the program with a requirement that Congress was to be notified at 
least seven days prior to initiation of a capacity building program.  The bill authorized 
armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police forces 
to be trained or equipped.28   
The bill was passed by the Senate with only a few modifications to the Inhofe 
amendment.  The bill proposed that Congress be notified at least 15 days prior to a 
project’s initiation, vice seven from the amendment.  Also, the bill proposed that Section 
1206 should follow the authorities and limitations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961.29   
There was no similar provision for Global Train and Equip Authority in the 
House Armed Services Committee bill.  In the Conference Report on defense 
authorization, further modifications to this authority were made.  The report pointed out 
that in the past this type of authority had always been performed by the Department of 
State.  The Conference Report further defined the capacity building programs and made it 
clear that the United States had to be a participant in each project.  The report limited the 
resources that could be applied to the program to equipment, supplies, and training.  The 
provision also required that the Secretary of Defense jointly formulate with the Secretary 
of State any program conducted under the authority.  The report limited the authority to 
 
26 United States Congress.  Senate. S.1042. SA 2432. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 United States Congress. Senate. S.1042 (As passed by Senate). 
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two years, and required the President to submit a report to Congress explaining the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current laws governing building partnership capacity.30  
The report also stated that the authority was a pilot program and reauthorization 
depended on the report to Congress from the President. Following the passage of the 
Conference Report, Section 1206 became law. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter discussed the need for Global Train and Equip Authority, as well as 
its legislative origin.  FMS/FMF and IMET are traditional State Department programs on 
which Section 1206 is loosely based.  FMS/FMF and IMET were formed towards the 
beginning of the Cold War to handle a Cold War environment.  Section 1206 is more 
flexible and intended to provide more capability to deal with the urgent threats that the 
U.S. faces in a post Cold War environment.     
 
 
30 United States Congress. House. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. 
Conference Report. 
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III. THE 1206 PROCESS 
A. SECTION 1206 PROCESS 
1. Conditions 
 The Section 1206 Process is meant for DOD and State Department cooperation in 
coordinating and conducting Global Train and Equip programs.  Section 1206 requires 
that programs under its authority observe and respect human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the legitimate civilian authority within that country.  Global Train and 
Equip Authority cannot be used to provide assistance that is prohibited by any other 
provision of law.  The authority also may not be used to provide assistance to a country 
that is prohibited from receiving such assistance by any other provision of law.31  
 Under Section 1206, the President may direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct 
programs to support a foreign country’s national military forces to aid them in conducting 
counterterrorist operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in 
which U.S. Armed Forces are a participant.  The authority allows funding to be used for 
equipment, supplies and training.  The FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act 
allowed the Secretary of Defense to use up to $200,000,000 of funds available for 
defense-wide operation and maintenance to conduct and support activities directed by the 
President under the limitations of Section 1206.32 
2. DOD and State Department Cooperation 
 Global Train and Equip Authority must by jointly approved by the DOD and State 
Department.  Section 1206 of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization 
Act delegated approval authority from the President to the Secretary of Defense with 
 
 
31 Nina M. Serafino,  Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006:  A Fact 
Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces.  CRS Report for 
Congress.  June 3, 2008.  p. 2. 
32 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. H.R. 1815. 
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Secretary of State concurrence.  DOD and State Department officials interpret the term 
“concurrence” to mean that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State must 
approve all projects.33 
3. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Role in Section 1206 Authority 
 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), as with FMS/FMF and 
IMET, is the management agency that provides security cooperation between the U.S. 
and foreign nations.  The DSCA has security assistance officers at embassies that 
implement Section 1206 programs in the same way that other traditional State 
Department funded security assistance programs are implemented.  The DSCA 
establishes terms and conditions of equipment transfers and provides fiscal oversight.  At 
the embassy the security assistance officer is the point of contact to ensure delivery and 
proper use by the recipient country.34   
4.  Congressional Notification 
 The President is directed to provide a written copy to Congress of any directives 
given to the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support Global Train and Equip 
programs.  No fewer than 15 days prior to a project occurring, the Secretary of Defense in 
coordination with the Secretary of State is required to submit to the congressional 
defense, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees a notice of the fundamentals of 
the project to be undertaken.35 
 Additionally, Congress directed the President to submit a report one year from the 
date of enactment examining the following issues: 
 
 
33 Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Finding on Criteria, Coordination, and 
Implementation.  Government Accountability Office Report. February 28, 2007. p. 2. 
34 Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Finding on Criteria, Coordination, and 
Implementation.  Government Accountability Office Report. February 28, 2007. p. 3. 
35 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. H.R. 1815. 
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 The strengths and weaknesses of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms 
Export Control Act, and any other provision of law related to the building of the 
capacity of foreign governments or the training and equipping of foreign military 
forces. 
 The changes, if any, that should be made to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
the Arms Export Control Act, and any other relevant provision of law that would 
improve the ability of the United States Government to build the capacity of 
foreign governments or train and equip military forces. 
 The organizational and procedural changes, if any, that should be made in the 
State Department and DOD to improve their ability to conduct programs to build 
the capacity of foreign governments or to train and equip military forces. 
 The resources and funding mechanisms required to assure adequate funding.36 
5. Project Submission 
 A normal Section 1206 submission follows this basic template: 
 Combatant Commander/Chief of Mission initiates request and completes proposal 
template. 
 Combatant Commander/Chief of Mission coordinates with their DOD/State 
Department counterpart and submits proposal through their chain-of-command. 
 The Joint Staff, DOD, and State Department review and prioritize all proposals. 
 The DSCA assesses executability and verifies cost estimates. 
 The Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller determines funding 
availability. 
 Proposals go to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State for approval. 
 Upon approval, the proposals are submitted to the President. 
 Congress is notified within 15 days of execution of the project.37 
B. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMAND 
During his April 7, 2006 testimony of General James L. Jones, then Commander 
of U.S. European Command, to the House Armed Services Committee regarding capacity 
building of foreign nations military’s, it was made clear what Global Train and Equip 
 
36 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. H.R. 1815.  
37 Sattler, LGEN John F. The View from the Joint Staff. (PP) 
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Authority could accomplish in the European Command area of responsibility.  General 
Jones began his testimony by placing the funding and authority related to Section 1206 
within the larger context of security cooperation in his area of responsibility: 
When I testified before this committee last month, I stated 
that we based our strategies on the principle that it is much 
more cost-effective to prevent conflicts than it is to stop 
one once it’s started.  I cannot overstate the importance of 
our theater security cooperation programs as the 
centerpiece to securing our Homeland from the irregular 
and catastrophic threats of the 21st Century.  EUCOM’s 
programs represent a proactive approach to building 
partnership capacity with the intent of enabling emerging 
democracies to defend their homeland, defeat terrorist 
extremists, develop common economic and security 
interests, and respond to health crises such as potential 
pandemic influenza outbreaks.38  
General Jones continued by speaking about the changing security landscape that 
has evolved since the end of the Cold War.  The increasingly inter-connected world that 
we live in has compelled the U.S. to develop new strategies to deal with present day 
challenges and threats. The U.S. cannot afford to use the security cooperation tools 
developed for the Cold War environment.  General Jones stated that three essential 
elements must be achieved in this security environment to be successful:   
..timely intervention to unanticipated challenges that will 
help mitigate or prevent crises that are harmful to U.S. 
interests; the need to work closely with our friends and 
allies to enhance regional security; and institutional 
innovations that contribute to comprehensive coordination 
throughout the interagency and within the framework of the 
international community.39 
General Jones believes that Global Train and Equip Authority will be the catalyst to 
security cooperation reform.  He states that all of the Combatant Commanders are using a 
new approach by focusing on and addressing threats at their inception, which is called 
“Phase Zero.”  Combatant Commanders are trying to eliminate conditions favorable to 
 
38Gen James L. A. Jones, A Commander’s Perspective on Building the Capacity of Foreign Countries 
Military Forces.  April 7, 2006. p. 1.  
39 Ibid., p. 2.  
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terrorist networks in their areas of responsibility.  To combat these conditions, they are 
conducting counterterrorist operations and participating in or providing support to 
military and stability operations in which the U.S. is a participant.40 
 During his testimony, General Jones highlighted two European Command 
initiatives that would greatly benefit from Global Train and Equip Authority.  The first 
initiative was the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Initiative.  General Jones explained 
that the Gulf of Guinea has an ungoverned maritime environment that is easy for 
terrorists and criminals to operate.  The coastal area is nearly 2,000 nautical miles long 
and largely uncontrolled, and corruption in the local, regional and national governments 
make the problem worse.  The region lacks significant maritime and coastal security 
forces, and is not able to provide a deterrent to prevent criminal and malicious acts in the 
area.  At the same time, in a parallel effort, the issues of poor governance, lack of legal 
infrastructure, and pervasive corruption must be addressed.41 
 The second initiative General Jones proposed was the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI).  TSCTI is the long-term interagency plan to combat 
terrorism in trans-Saharan Africa using the full range of political, economic, development 
and security tools.  TSCTI was created due to concern about Islamic terrorist 
organizations operating in the Sahel region of Africa.  The approach to combat these 
terrorist organizations is to build indigenous capacity and facilitate cooperation between 
the governments of the Sahel region.  If this initiative is left unattended, political 
instability in Africa could require reactive and repeated interventions that could have a 
large price tag.  However, for a small investment upfront to address the problem 




40 Gen James L. Jones, A Commander’s Perspective on Building the Capacity of Foreign Countries 
Military Forces.  April 7, 2006. p. 1.   
41 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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General Jones concluded his testimony as follows: 
Section 1206 funding and authorities are important steps 
toward creating the kind of flexible, responsive, 
interagency programs we need for the 21st Century.  These 
efforts support the long-term strategic objectives of the 
Global War on Terrorism by building understanding and 
consensus on the terrorist threat, laying foundations for 
future “coalitions of the willing,” and extending our 
country’s security perimeter.43 
C. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
POLICY 
The Honorable Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, also 
addressed the House Armed Services Committee on April 7, 2006.  In the beginning of 
Mr. Edelman’s testimony, he referred to the National Security Strategy and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review.  He pointed out that the National Security Strategy called 
for a transformation of America’s national security institutions and for strengthened 
alliances to defeat terrorism and prevent attacks against the U.S.  The Quadrennial 
Defense Review stated that the ability of the U.S. to work with allies to influence the 
global environment is necessary in defeating terrorist networks.  Mr. Edelman went on to 
say: 
Sending our troops into harm’s way without competent 
partner military and security forces significantly increases 
the risks they face.  The existence of capable, competent 
partners reduces stress on our military, as many Global War 
on Terrorism tasks are best accomplished by and with 
partner nations who know the local geography, language, 
and culture.44 
Mr. Edelman went on to point out that it costs $90,000 to sustain a U.S. troop in theater, 
whereas it only costs $11,000 to support an Afghan troop or $40,000 for an Iraqi troop.45  
 
43 Gen James L. Jones. A Commander’s Perspective on Building the Capacity of Foreign Countries 
Military Forces.  April 7, 2006. p. 7. 
44 Edelman, Eric. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Train and Equip 
Authority.  April 7, 2006.  
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He added that building partnership capacity was essential in reducing ungoverned areas, 
thus depriving terrorist organizations areas to operate.  “The train and equip authorities 
created during the Cold War,” he said, “are ill-suited to the adaptive, asymmetric, non-
state threats we face today.”46  
 Mr. Edelman noted that in October 2001, the President announced support for 
training Georgian forces to close terrorist safe havens along its borders.  To do this, the 
U.S. used funds from seven different U.S. sources in two agencies as well as allied 
contributions.  It took seven months to begin staff level training, nearly a year to begin 
tactical training, and the four battalions did not stand up until two and half years from 
inception.  However, once the battalions were active they made significant 
contributions.47   
 Mr. Edelman praised the vision of Congress to initiate the Section 1206 
Authority, but he listed the following challenges: 
 Section 1206 is limited to national military forces, when a variety of security and 
non-national military forces are on the front lines. 
 The authority comes from defense-wide operations and maintenance funds, which 
is a small portion of DOD operations and maintenance funds. 
 The authority is limited by numerous foreign assistance restrictions, and there is 
no waiver option for critical national security issues. 
 The authority is limited to $200 million, when the demand for projects is much 
higher than that. 
 The authority requires Presidential certification for each specific country, which is 
a time consuming process that detracts from the speed in which projects can be 
executed. 
 
46 Eric Edelman. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Train and Equip 
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After discussing the challenges, Mr. Edelman reported that DOD and the State 
Department had developed changes to the Global Train and Equip Authority and 
submitted them to Congress for consideration.48 
 Mr. Edelman closed his remarks by discussing the nature of the strategic 
environment: 
In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, fragile states 
were viewed primarily as a humanitarian issue.  However, 
we now recognize fragile states and ungoverned areas as 
potential breeding grounds for terrorism and safe havens 
for global terrorist organizations.  1206 authority helps us 
address this reality by leveraging and coordinating the 
strengths of the Departments of State and Defense to build 
partnership capacity, win the Global War on Terrorism, and 
protect the lives of our active duty, reserve, and National 
Guard servicemen and women.49 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter discussed the Section 1206 process and the need for it from the 
perspective of the commander of U.S European Command and the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy during the middle of FY2006.  These two key players testified about 
the benefits of the authority as well as areas that could be modified to make the authority 
better.  Section 1206 Authority has regulations and conditions that must be met, just like 
any other authority.  Section 1206 projects are worked cooperatively between the DOD 
and Department of State, and approved projects are managed by the DSCA, who 
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IV. OPPOSITION ARGUMENT AND ISSUES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, Section 1206 has been one of the most controversial DOD 
foreign assistance programs.  The most widely argued point is that Global Train and 
Equip Authority gives DOD too much influence on foreign policy.  Training and 
equipping the world’s armies is a major foreign policy decision.  Whenever the U.S. 
decides to train and equip a foreign military, it is perceived as an endorsement of that 
military and a reflection of how the U.S. projects its power.  Also, strengthening a 
military has the ability to affect the balance of power within a region or country.     
In addition to foreign policy, there are also issues with how Section 1206 is 
implemented at the embassy level.  For example, embassies have complained about the 
lack of communication concerning projects, and analysts question DOD use of 
contractors to conduct projects.   
B. TESTIMONY OF DR. GORDON ADAMS 
Dr. Gordon Adams, a Professor of International Studies at American University 
and a former OSD Comptroller, testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on April 24, 2008 concerning the national security toolkit.  Dr. Adams pointed 
out that since 2001 there has been a continual expansion of security and foreign 
assistance programs being carried out through the DOD and that many of the programs 
parallel existing Department of State programs.50  It is also a growing concern that U.S. 
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Dr. Adams noted that the DOD has sought permanent authority under Title 10 of 
the U.S. Code for Section 1206, has asked for increased funding authority, and wants to 
waive the restrictions of the Foreign Assistance Act.  Dr. Adams asked the Foreign 
Relations Committee to look closely at programs such as Section 1206 before making 
them permanent, arguing that: 
While it is understandable that DOD would focus on 
combating terrorist organizations, the central direction of 
U.S. foreign and national security policy is not the 
responsibility of the Defense Department.  It is the 
responsibility of the White House and the Department of 
State.52 
 Dr. Adams also discussed the down-side risks of the increased role of DOD in 
foreign affairs.  First, continuing the trend imposes a severe cost on the military.  It 
expands their roles and missions when they are already fighting two wars and stretched 
thin.  The governance and economic development of countries is not a military mission 
and requires additional operations, requirements and training of our forces.  Also, the 
funding comes from DOD operating funds that compete for other initiatives that could 
support the troops in the field.53 
 Second, assuming that only the military has the funding and organization to carry 
out programs such as Section 1206 has the effect of further weakening the civilian toolkit 
that currently exists.  The State Department’s development and diplomatic tools have 
been weakened by fiscal neglect and inattention, so expanding the military’s role makes 
the weaknesses of the civilian tools a self-fulfilling prophecy by becoming less 
organized, funded or staffed for the responsibilities they should have.54   
 Third, assigning programs such as Section 1206 to DOD reduces their visibility to 
Congress.  Section 1206 makes up less than one percent of the approximate half trillion 
dollar DOD budget.  Therefore, it will not receive the amount of oversight it would were 
it in the less robust International Affairs budget.55 
 
52 Gordon Adams.  Rebalancing and Integrating the National Security Toolkit.  April 24, 2008.  p. 14. 
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 Fourth, and possibly the most serious, using DOD to perform security assistance 
programs puts a uniformed face on U.S. international engagement.  This expanded 
military role is not always viewed benignly outside the U.S.  A growing foreign 
assistance role for our military could send the wrong message, one that could prove to be 
counter-productive in the long term.56   
 Dr. Adams went on to say that the DOD is a key implementer of security 
assistance, and they should continue to fill that role.  However, they should be filling the 
role “under the policy direction and budget planning of America’s foreign policy 
agencies, which are responsible for and attentive to the overall relationship between the 
U.S. and the recipient country.”57  He also said the military’s role in security assistance 
should be limited to “short-term, humanitarian, emergency-based, and in areas where the 
security environment does not permit civilian operations.”58   
 Dr. Adams proposed that Global Train and Equip Authority should fall under the 
existing FMF program.  An option for providing more flexible train and equip support 
would be to provide it through a drawdown—a special allocation of funds—by the 
President on the recommendation of the Secretary of State.  Dr. Adams noted that this 
was a simple fix that would increase the flexibility of FMF and allow projects to be 
executed on shorter notice.  Dr. Adams further argued that programs like Section 1206 
should be a State Department responsibility because “the initiative should lie with the 
department that has responsibility for our overall relationship with other countries and 
can set the desirability of a T&E program in the framework of our broader strategic and 
foreign policy purposes.”59  Dr. Adams stated that in the end, foreign/security assistance 
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resides with the DOD, and it is critical for the State Department to get the balance back 
and provide the broader policy oversight for which the State Department should be 
responsible.60 
C.   EMBASSY LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
 Global Train and Equip Authority has specific language in the bill that governs 
the conditions for its uses.  However, due to a lack of oversight and coordination the 
authority was misused.  In FY2006, only 5 of 14 proposals that were submitted to the 
State Department and DOD for review by combatant commands were coordinated with 
the ambassadors and embassy teams.  In 9 of the 14 proposals, coordination took place 
before the State Department or DOD notified Congress.61 In the case of the Trans-Sahara 
Counter Terrorism Initiative, one embassy was not notified that it was to receive 
assistance until after the President announced it in May 2006.  The ambassador 
subsequently opposed the assistance and prevailed.  In the Gulf of Guinea initiative, the 
embassy team that covers Sao Tome and Principe did not know that its participation was 
being considered until late into the process.  In this case, the ambassador supported the 
mission.  In a third case, Equatorial Guinea, a problematic country that is a strategic point 
in the Gulf of Guinea, was on the original presidential list of Section 1206 countries 
before it was removed due to congressional scrutiny.62    
 There was also concern about using Section 1206 funding to train and equip 
nations with human rights violations.  In 2006 and 2007, Global Train and Equip 
Authority was used to provide the Sri Lankan military with nearly $14 million.  During 
this time frame, the Sri Lankan government was accused of supporting a non-
governmental force known as the Karuna group that regularly attacked civilians.  
Simultaneously, the U.S. Congress was developing language to restrict security 
assistance to Sri Lanka.  In 2007, Chadian security forces received $6 million in Global 
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Train and Equip Authority to create a light infantry rapid reaction force.  At the same 
time, according to Amnesty International, those security forces were engaged in 
extrajudicial killings, politically motivated disappearances, rape, the use of child soldiers, 
and battles with a rebel armed group.63   
 Another issue deals with the appropriate mix of military and civilian foreign 
assistance.  In the Caribbean, there is a threat of terrorists trafficking humans and 
equipment via boat/ship to the U.S.  To mitigate this, the Dominican Republic received 
approximately $7.5 million in Section 1206 funding in FY2006 for interceptor boats and 
maritime communications systems and training, and $800,000 in U.S. funds went 
towards public diplomacy.64  In this case, the majority of the funding was used to fix a 
problem in the short term and only a small amount of funding was provided to fix the 
long term problem.  The issue lies with how the U.S. divides its foreign/security 
assistance resources.   
 Others oppose Section 1206 because the program relies heavily on private 
contractors.65  The argument is that if Section 1206 is inherently defense related it should 
be conducted by military service members.  In turn, if it can be solely conducted by 
private contractors then the State Department should be able to control the authority.66 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter discussed the range of issues concerning Section 1206 from the 
policy level to the embassy/ground level.  To some critics, Section 1206 is seen as 
contributing to a trend of militarization of diplomatic functions.  Other opposition to 
Section 1206 stems from problems of implementation at the embassy level concerning 
communication and coordination between combatant commanders and embassy teams.   
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V. LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 1206 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 As a new piece of legislation and a pilot program, Section 1206 received much 
attention from Congress.  At the same time, the Secretaries of Defense and State were 
looking at ways to optimize the way Global Train and Equip Authority could be utilized.  
This chapter describes the requests from the two Secretaries and the actual modifications 
that Congress agreed to. 
B. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
 On April 15, 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates addressed the House 
Armed Services Committee regarding the challenges facing our national security 
apparatus.  At the beginning of his testimony, he spoke about the flexibility of the Global 
Train and Equip Authority, the authority’s ability to respond to emerging threats and 
opportunities, and the how it has become a model for interagency cooperation.67  
 Secretary Gates then addressed the opposition to Section 1206, explaining why 
the authority should rest with the DOD and the State Department.  He stated that, “In my 
view, building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement--irrespective 
of the capacity of other departments—and its authorities and funding mechanisms should 
reflect that reality.”68  He then made the caveat that Section 1206 must be implemented 
in close coordination with the Department of State.69  Noting the military’s previous lack 
of interest in programs like FMF, Gates indicated that large amounts of capacity building 
would be necessary to fulfill the mission of the military when FMF began.  After 9/11, 
military planners understood that America’s security was reliant upon the security of her 
partners.  Secretary Gates stated, “As borne out by Afghanistan, Iraq, and in other 
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theaters large and small, success in the war on terror will depend as much on the capacity 
of allies and partners in the moderate Muslim world as on the capabilities of our own 
forces.”70 
 Secretary Gates noted that in the past, there was a reasonable degree of certainty 
about the adversary that U.S. forces would face.  However, the last 25 years have shown 
that threats can emerge from anywhere.  At the same time, our resources and forces have 
and will remain finite, even considering the personnel plus-ups of the Army and Marine 
Corps.  To fill this gap, he said, “we must help our allies and partners to confront 
extremists and other potential sources of global instability with their borders.”71  He 
added that this type of work takes years, and it needs to begin before festering problems 
turn into crises that require military intervention causing substantial financial, political, 
and human cost.72 
 Secretary Gates then noted that Section 1206 was not a duplicate of, or substitute 
for, how the State Department conducts FMF.  “Historically,” Gates noted, “the FMF 
account has been used by State to build relationships and nurture access over a period of 
many years.”73  The primary benefits of Section 1206 will be seen in10 to 15 years, he 
added, but immediate impacts have already been made.  Examples include: 
 Providing urgently needed parts and ammunition for the Lebanese Army to defeat 
a serious Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist threat in a Palestinian refugee camp. 
 Supplying helicopter spare parts, night-vision devices, and night-flight training to 
enhance the ability of Pakistani Special Forces to help fight Al Qaeda terrorists in 
the Northwest Territories.  
 Setting up cordons run by partner nations in waters surrounding Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines that, over time, will reduce the risk of terrorism and 
piracy in Southeast Asia.74 
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e ploit their vulnerabilities 
or look for ways to co-opt them.76 
C. REPORT TO CONGRESS 
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 Secretary Gates then asked Congress to extend Section 1206, because it was due 
to expire at the end of the fiscal year.  He also asked that Congress make the authority 
permanent because building partner capacity is an enduring DOD mission.  He asked to 
increase the funding authority to $750 million per fiscal year, which was a reflection of 
combatant commander requirements.  He also requested that Section 1206 not be limited 
to “military forces” and should include “security forces.”  He argued that forces abroad 
come under many different names and categories, but they often look like our own 
military forces.  Secretary Gates commented, “The Department [DOD] does not seek to 
train “beat cops,” but we cannot impose our institutional arrangements on our 
partners.”75 
rds to Section 1206, Secretary Gates concluded: 
It is also important to remember that our competitors, 
antagonists, and potential adversaries are not standing still 
when it comes to extending their influence through security 
assistance.  If we don’t build the capacity of our own 
partners, then others may either x
 The report to Congress that was required by the language in Section 1206(f) of the 
2006 National Defense Authorization Act was delegated to the Secretary of State by the 
President.  The document addressed all of the
specifically addressed changes to Section 1206.77 
 The Secretary of State asked for the following amendm
FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act: 
 Increase the funding level from $300 million to $7
 Allow assistance to non-military s
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 Enable training of forces to participate in or support military and stability 
 Build the capacity of security forces in a county when U.S. forces are deployed in 
authority to the President or the Secretary of State under existing 
waiver authorities or upon determining that it is in the national security interests 
ity to meet time-sensitive requirements to build the capacity of foreign 
D. LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS FROM FY2007 TO FY2009 
f State, to notify Congress in writing of any Global Train and Equip programs they 
 
                                                
 Elimination of the sunset clause. 
operations that are consistent with the security interests of the U.S. 
large-scale stability operations in that country. 
 Allow waiver 
of the U.S. 78 




In the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, there were 
four major modifications to Section 1206 from the previous year.  The first modification 
placed the Secretary of Defense (with concurrence from the Secretary of State) in charge 
of Global Train and Equip Authority instead of the President.80  The next modification 
increased the funding authority from $200 million to $300 million and allowed the 
funding to come from the operations and maintenance account—a much bigger account 
than the previously authorized defense-wide operations and maintenance account.81  The 
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intended to conduct.82  In the previous year’s bill this was conducted by the President.  
The last modification extended the authority of the program by one year, which gave it a 
termination date of September 30, 2008.83 
2. FY2009 
In the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, 
there are three primary modifications.  The first modification added the authority to build 
the capacity of a foreign country’s maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism 
operations, whereas before only national military forces were included in the 
authorization.84  The next modification increased the funding level from $300 million to 
$350 million per fiscal year and allowed programs that cross one fiscal year to use 
funding from the fiscal year in which the program was initiated.85  The last modification 
extended the authority three years, which gave it a termination date of September 30, 
2011.86 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter discussed the Secretary of Defense’s perspective on Global Train 
and Equip Authority, the report to Congress from the Secretary of State that was directed 
from the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act, and the actual modifications to the 
FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act in the FY2007 and FY2009 Acts.     
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VI. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1206 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Between FY2006 and FY2008, Global Train and Equip Authority has been used 
in over thirty countries, to include all of the U.S. Combatant Commands.  Over fifty 
Section 1206 projects totaling more than $500 million have given many countries and 
regions counterterrorism capabilities they could not have afforded to procure on their 
own.  (For more information refer to Appendices A, B and C). 
In February 2008, the Office of Global Security Affairs in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense requested an assessment of Section 1206 programs to be conducted 
by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA).87  The assessment was to cover the operational 
impact of Section 1206 funded projects in selected countries and an “evaluation of the 
alignment between 1206 programs and broader national goals.”88  To collect data for this 
study, CNA conducted background research leveraging government, academic, and 
media sources, and consulted military and civilian subject matter experts in the 
Washington, D.C. area.89   
B. OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF SECTION 1206 FUNDED PROJECTS IN 
LEBANON 
The Section 1206 projects for Lebanon in FY2006 and FY2007 have focused on 
providing trucks, vehicle spare parts, aircraft spare parts, small arms, secure 
communications and body armor to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).90 
 
87 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008.  p. 5.   
88 Ibid., p. 5. 
89 Ibid., p. 5.  
90 Ibid., p. 11.  
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1. Background 
In April 2005, Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon turning the security of the 
country over to the LAF.  However, the LAF was not prepared to conduct this mission 
due to inadequate forces and aging equipment as a result of Lebanon’s isolation from the 
international community, because of the Syrian domination of the Lebanese government.  
In fact, the U.S. had not provided security assistance to Lebanon since 1989.91   
In July 2006, Israel began a 33-day air and ground attack against Hezbollah and 
suspected Hezbollah infrastructure in Lebanon.  The United Nations Security Council 
passed a resolution that called for the deployment of Lebanese forces into southern 
Lebanon to assure Lebanese sovereignty, to ensure Israeli security, to assert control over 
areas previously held by Hezbollah, and to disrupt smuggling across the Syrian border.  
The Combined Border Force (CBF) was created, comprised of LAF and other forces.  
The CBF’s mission is to secure the border region to prevent the flow of weapons to non-
state actors, which include Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations.92 
In May 2007, Fatah al-Islam, an Islamist terrorist organization that had operated 
near the Nahr Al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp in Northern Lebanon, attacked a 
Lebanese Army unit guarding the camp.  The LAF responded by attacking the camp to 
flush out the Al-Qaeda linked organization.  The LAF suffered over 2,000 casualties in 
the three month battle.93 
The LAF has an extremely limited budget.  An estimated 90-95 percent of their 
defense budget goes to wages and benefits of active duty and retired soldiers.94  Also 
political turmoil, conflict and terrorist attacks have combined to squelch tax revenue.  
Therefore, there is limited funding available for acquisition, training, and operations and 
maintenance. 
 
91 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. p. 11.  
92 Ibid., p. 12. 
93 Ibid., p. 12. 
94 Ibid., p. 12. 
 2. Section 1206 Usage 
In FY2006, Lebanon’s projects focused on providing mobility support to the LAF 
as it prepared to begin its counterterrorism mission.  The approximately $10 million in 
Global Train and Equip authority in FY2006 (as depicted in Table 1) was used for parts 
for 2.5 ton trucks, spares for M113 armored personnel carriers, parts for Commercial 
Utility Cargo Vehicles (CUGVs), and spare parts for UH-1H helicopters.95 
Table 1.   FY2006 Lebanon 1206 Cases 
FY06 Case Case Value Program Value
Vehicle spares for 5-ton trucks $3,360,000
M113 APC spare parts $2,304,960
CUCV spare parts $2,363,200
UH-1H spare parts $1,129,787
UH-1H spare parts $1,331,443
Lebanon $10,489,390
 
In FY2007, Lebanon received approximately $30 million in Section 1206 
authority (as shown in Table 2).96  These projects included small arms ammunition, 
weapons, night vision devices, body armor, additional vehicle spares, transportation of 
U.S. 2.5 ton trucks from Germany, secure communications equipment, and a training 





                                                 
95 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. p. 13. 
96 Ibid., p. 13.  
97 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
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Table 2.   FY2007 Lebanon 1206 Cases 
FY07 Case Case Value Program Value
Small arms ammo $6,939,107
EDA tranportation $1,029,879
UH-1H spare parts $5,500,000
M4 and M16 spare parts $500,000
Traininig program site survey $399,000
Wheeled vehicle spare parts $4,440,000
Individual soldier equipment OCIE $3,070,000
LOS LAN comms equipment $204,437
Secure comms equipment, NVGs $6,427,884
SAPI body armor $1,887,000
Lebanon $30,397,307
 
3.  Operational Impact 
a. M113 Spare Parts 
The LAF has approximately 1,000 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers in 
its inventory.98  However, many of them are used as fixed fighting positions because they 
lack spare parts and track pads.  The LAF has had the M113s in their inventory for many 
years and they are able to maintain and repair the vehicles.  They are even able to make 
spare parts in their machine shops for the simpler parts.  However, they are unable to 
replace specialized parts such as electronic sensors that they are unable to make.  
Therefore, the logistics brigade can make good use of any spare parts that are provided.  
The Section 1206 funded track pads were put to use immediately and transformed fixed 
fighting positions into vehicles that once again maneuvered.  Those vehicles were then 
used to conduct patrols and support deployed forces.99  
                                                 
98 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. p. 14.  
99 Ibid., p. 15. 
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b. 2.5 Ton Truck Delivery 
Section 1206 funded 200 2.5 ton trucks delivered from Germany to 
Beirut.100  The trucks were more modern versions of the 2.5 ton trucks in the LAF 
inventory.  The trucks arrived in Lebanon in December 2006 and January 2007.  The 
trucks that were operational were immediately put into service deploying, repositioning, 
and providing logistics support and supplies to units in the country.101 
The LAF indicated that of the 200 vehicles, 169 were in service.102  The 
non-mission capable vehicles had maintenance or repair parts problems.  The LAF did 
report that they did not receive technical manuals with the vehicles.  This made it difficult 
for them to troubleshoot the modern equipment, such as the automatic tire pressure 
system and the automatic transmission.103   
c. Helicopter Repair and Maintenance 
The LAF Air Force has 23 UH-1 helicopters in its fleet.104  Prior to 
receiving Section 1206 funded spare parts, the LAF had between five to six operational 
aircraft on a given day.  After the funding, there were between ten and eleven operational 
aircraft per day.105  The helicopters were used for medical evacuations, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, command and control of dispersed forces, and ground attacks via the use 
of 250-pound bombs.106  
 
100 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. p. 15.  
101 Ibid., p. 15.  
102 Ibid., p. 15. 
103 Ibid., p. 15.  
104 Ibid., p. 16.  
105 Ibid., p. 16.  
106 Ibid., p. 17.  
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d. Small Arms Ammunition 
The U.S. delivered over five million rounds of pistol and M16 ammunition 
to the LAF just following the conclusion of the Nahr Al Barid battle.107  This 
ammunition was used to replace the depleted small arms ammunition stocks.  This 
ammunition provides less than four ammunition basic loads for LAF M16s and nine 
ammunition basic loads for LAF pistols.108 
e.  Communications Equipment 
In FY2007, the LAF purchased Datron secure, frequency hopping radios 
using Section 1206 funding.  These radios included handheld models, backpack models 
and radio sets for vehicles.  These radios provided the first secure communications 
capability for the LAF.  Prior to receipt of the new radios, the LAF units were using non-
secure VHF radios and cell phones to pass operational information.  The LAF reported 
that they are now able to pass sensitive information over secure channels to 
headquarters.109 
C. OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF SECTION 1206 FUNDED PROJECTS IN 
PAKISTAN 
Section 1206 projects in Pakistan are intended to provide the capability for 
Pakistani special operations forces to conduct airborne night strike operations against 
terrorists in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in eastern Pakistan.  
FY2006 and FY 2007 Section 1206 projects in Pakistan have focused on increasing the 
capacity and capability of the Pakistani rotary wing aviation units and improving the 
equipment and training of Pakistani special operations forces.110 
 
107 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. p. 17. 
108 Ibid., p. 18.  
109 Ibid., pp. 18-19.  
110 Ibid., p. 23. 
 1. Background 
The Pakistani military has limited capability to operate in the FATA.  Ground 
travel by road is extremely dangerous and susceptible to ambushes, sniper attacks, and 
improvised explosive devices.  Pakistani units engaged in combat with enemies in the 
FATA find that their adversary has superior knowledge of the territory and has a tactical 
advantage.  With that advantage, the enemy uses the cover of night to conduct 
surveillance, reinforcement, withdrawal and to stage attacks against Pakistani forces.111 
2.  Section 1206 Usage 
In FY2006, Section 1206 projects (displayed in Table 3) for Pakistan included 
spare parts, aviation body armor, night vision goggles (NVGs), a night targeting system 
for Cobra helicopters, and limited visibility training for pilots.  The aircraft targeted for 
spare parts were the Mi-17 hip transport helicopters, Bell 412 transport helicopters, and 
the AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters.112 
Table 3.   FY2006 Pakistan 1206 Cases 
FY06 Case Case Value Program Value
Aviation NVGs, helmet mounts $648,299
Cobra, B412 spares and accessories $13,410,880
Mi-17 spare parts $6,400,000
Aviation body armor $168,000
Site survey for C-NITE $99,157
Limited visibility pilot training $2,589,120
Pakistan $23,315,456
 
FY2007 Section 1206 projects (as shown in Table 4) included body armor, 
weapons and ammunition, weapons modification, radios, and additional modifications to 
Mi-17 helicopters, including door mounted machine guns.  Most of the distribution of 
FY2007 Section 1206 funded equipment is paired with specialized training by U.S. 
special operations forces under a program called Joint Combined Exchange Training.113 
                                                 
111 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. p. 24.  
112 Ibid., p. 25. 
113 Ibid., p. 26.  
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 Table 4.   FY2007 Pakistan 1206 Cases 
FY07 Case Case Value Program Value
Mi-17 modifications $6,721,776
Radios, soldiere equipment, Ak-47 
accessories, 9mm pistols, ammo $1,339,979
Comms system, infantry target system, 
Ak-47 accessories $5,172,948
GPS, body armor, non-lethal weapons s $518,840
Pakistan $13,753,543
 
3.  Operational Impact 
a. Night Helicopter Operations 
Limited visibility training and NVG equipment and training have had an 
operational impact on forces conducting counterterrorist operations.  As a result of the 
training and equipment, the training and operational profile has changed.  Prior to Section 
1206 funding, there were no night time helicopter training or operational missions.  Since 
the funding has been received, 60 percent of the training and 20 percent of operational 
missions are conducted at night.114  Since the training, it was reported that special 
operations forces have been extracted from dangerous situations, and the Pakistani Army 
has been able to conduct night time medical evacuations of casualties.  Officials in the 
Pakistani Army believe that the increased capability gives the troops on the ground a 
boost in morale and will reduce casualties in the long run.115 
b.  Body Armor 
Section 1206 funded aviation body armor has impacted Pakistani 
operations in the FATA by expanding the operations area.  The Mi-17 helicopters are not 
armored and don’t have any cockpit protection, so the body armor gives the pilots and 
crew the added confidence to conduct operations in the FATA.116   
                                                 
114 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. p. 27.  
115 Ibid., p. 28. 
116 Ibid., p. 29.  
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c. Maintenance and Repair 
The operational availability of the Mi-17, Bell 412, and Cobra helicopters 
has a direct impact on the operations that Pakistani special operations forces can execute 
in the FATA.  Since July 2007, Pakistani operational tempo has increased dramatically.  
This increase has put a strain on the Pakistani Army’s capabilities, especially aviation.  
Section 1206 funded spare parts have been integral in keeping Pakistani aircraft in the air.  
The Section 1206 funded parts have increased operational availability of aircraft by over 
65 percent.117   
d.  Gunship Support 
Section 1206 funding was used for spare parts to keep Pakistani Cobras in 
the air.  Officials of the Pakistani Army believe that there is both an operational and 
psychological impact from having Cobra helicopters available to support special 
operations forces.  Operationally, the Cobras provide suppressive and covering fire for 
the Mi-17s that deploy and extract personnel.118  The Mi-17s are slow to take off and 
land and they possess little firepower, so the Cobras complement them well.  
Psychologically, the Cobras are a deterrent to the enemy.  It was noticed that the enemy is 
less willing to maneuver and fight when Cobras are in the air.119   
D. OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF SECTION 1206 FUNDED PROJECTS IN 
YEMEN 
In Yemen, FY2006 and FY2007 Section 1206 projects focused on strengthening 
the capabilities and capacity of the Yemeni Armed Forces to suppress terrorist activity 
and prevent cross-border arms trafficking.120 
 
117 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. pp. 29-30. 
118 Ibid., p. 31. 
119 Ibid., p. 31.  
120 Ibid., p. 35. 
 1. Background 
The main security concerns in Yemen are the porous state of its borders and the 
presence of terrorists in ungoverned areas.  Uncontrolled Yemeni borders provide 
opportunities for terrorists, arms and other materials to flow in and out of the country 
uncontested.  Also, the central government in Yemen lacks control over large areas of the 
country that allow terrorists to operate.  Traditionally, the northern portion of Yemen is 
an ungoverned area that extremists have used to launch attacks into Saudi Arabia and 
beyond.121   
2. Section 1206 Usage 
In FY2006, Section 1206 projects (as depicted in Table 5) focused on the mission 
of patrolling the Yemeni border.  Yemeni forces received light tactical vehicles, Harris 
tactical radios, weapons, ammunition, night vision devices, tactical radios, and computer 
equipment for a SOF command center.122  
Table 5.   FY2006 Yemen 1206 Cases 
FY06 Case Case Value Program Value
M4A1 carbines, ammo, spares $209,544
M24 sniper rifles, ammo, spares $187,628
M240B machine guns, ammo, spares $292,575
Ammunition $195,020
Vehicular radios, spares, installation $381,395
Light tactical vehicles (Ford Rangers), 
spares $1,875,820
CT operations center computers $100,000
YSOF operations center $100,000
HF/VHF radios, spares, training $949,392
Yemen $4,291,374
 
In FY2007, Section 1206 projects (as shown in Table 6) focused on logistics and 
mobility support to the Yemeni special operations forces.123   
                                                 
121 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. pp. 35-36. 
122 Ibid., p. 37. 
123 Ibid., p. 37. 
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 Table 6.   FY2007 Yemen 1206 Cases 
FY07 Case Case Value Program Value
Maintenance training $36,556
M115A1 UAHs and spares $7,030,000
5-ton cargo trucks and spares $7,292,000
Infantry light armored vehicles and 
spares $9,629,866
M113 and M35 spares $1,750,000
Joint visual inspection $250,000
Yemen $25,988,422
 
3. Operational Impact 
a. Equipment for Border Forces 
The Yemeni military has deployed Section 1206 funded weapons, night 
vision goggles, radios and trucks to conduct border security operations.  However, the 
Yemeni forces do not have enough manpower and equipment to establish control over the 
entire border.124 
The Yemeni military has integrated the light tactical vehicles into their 
border patrol arsenal.  They have made modifications to the trucks by adding .50 caliber 
machine guns and bench seats.  They have also added commercial trucks to their arsenal 
to increase their operating area.  The Section 1206 funded vehicle spares have been 
important to keep the vehicles operational.125   
The Section 1206 funded Harris radios have also been of great importance 
to the Yemeni Armed Forces.  The radios allow the Yemeni forces to pass information 
and coordinate operations in the northern border region.126   
                                                 
124 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008.. p. 38. 
125 Ibid.,  pp. 38-39. 
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b. Maintenance Support 
As a result of Section 1206 funding, the Yemeni forces have improved 
their inventory storage, tracking and control program for U.S.-supplied equipment.  They 
have improved their warehouses and developed a computerized inventory control system.  
The light tactical vehicles are essentially commercially available Ford trucks, and the 
parts for them have significant black market value in Yemen.  Therefore, the Yemeni 
logistics command created controls and accountability procedures to track the vehicle 
spares.127 
E. OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF SECTION 1206 FUNDED PROJECTS IN 
SÃO TOME AND PRINCIPE 
In FY2006, Section 1206 projects for São Tome and Principe supported the 
development of a regional maritime awareness capability.  São Tome and Principe 
needed the capability to monitor licit and illicit traffic in the country’s territorial waters 
and the economic exclusion zone.128 
1. Background 
The waters of the Gulf of Guinea support commercial trade, fishing, petroleum 
export, and other maritime industries.  However, due to poor maritime security by São 
Tome and Principe and other Gulf of Guinea countries, smugglers, human traffickers, and 
pirates operate freely in the waters.  The recent discovery of off-shore oil deposits in the 





127 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. p. 39. 
128 Ibid., p. 41. 
129 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
 São Tome and Principe has a disintegrating maritime force due to lack of 
maintenance and spare parts.  Due to the poor state of its maritime security force, São 
Tome and Principe has extremely porous borders and minimal security to protect its one 
major commercial port or two minor oil and fishing ports.130 
2. Section 1206 Usage 
In FY2006, São Tome and Principe received $6.8 million (displayed in Table 7) 
in Section 1206 funding to address illicit maritime activities in what had long been an 
ungoverned area.  The Section 1206 funding was used to acquire commercially available 
maritime surface search radar, electro-optical/infra-red sensors, computer systems and 
communications equipment and training for São Tome and Principe Coast Guard 
personnel.131 
Table 7.   FY2006 São Tome and Principe 1206 Cases 
FY06 Case Case Value Program Value
RMAC technology insertion $512,000
Hardware $2,932,000
Shipping $15,000






Defense Transportation service charge $448,000







3. Operational Impact 
a. Ability to Observe 
São Tome and Principe added Automated Information System receivers to 
three of their four regional maritime awareness capability sites, and they are integrated 
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131 Ibid., p. 43. 
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into the Maritime Safety and Security Information System, a global database that tracks 
ships all over the world.  They have also added new radars that are now detecting vessels 
up to 50 miles out in good weather and 25 miles out in adverse weather.132  When the 
radars are fully operational, São Tome and Principe has the ability to develop a radar 
picture covering most of its territorial waters.133  
b. Ability to Identify 
The Automated Information System receivers allow the São Tome and 
Principe Coast Guard to monitor vessels and identify suspicious behavior in their waters.  
The receivers collect position, ship name, cargo, last port of call and next port of call 
information.  São Tome and Principe can identify suspicious activity by vessels that are 
stopped or traveling at extremely slow speeds in their territorial waters.  São Tome and 
Principe has additional hopes of having the capability to recognize patterns of suspected 
illicit activity.134 
c. Ability to React 
Section 1206 funding has provided VHF communication equipment to the 
São Tome and Principe Coast Guard.  The VHF communications equipment allows the 
maritime force to hail ships, conduct search and rescue operations, and ask nearby ships 
to report suspicious ships.  The radios also allow the São Tome and Principe Coast Guard 
to help identify ships that have their Automated Information System transponders turned 
off.135   
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The CNA study on the impact of Section 1206 projects in Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Yemen, and São Tome and Principe gave an assessment of how Section 1206 was 
utilized and has affected each country.  While Section 1206 is a young program, the 
utilization appears to match the intent of its use in the four countries discussed.   
 
132 Eric Thompson.  Assessments of the Impact of 1206-funded Projects in Selected Countries:  
Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe. July 2008. p. 45. 
133 Ibid., p. 45. 
134 Ibid., p. 46. 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
Global Train and Equip authority was created to be a flexible and fast acting 
security cooperation program to fill gaps left by FMF/FMS and IMET.  The authority has 
proponents and opponents, in part because Section 1206 is the first program of its kind in 
the DOD.  Proponents praise the authority because it has the ability to address critical 
global security issues rapidly, while opponents believe that Section 1206 symbolizes a 
militarization of diplomatic functions.  Section 1206 has grown as a program over the last 
three years.  It is hard to quantitatively measure the effect of Global Train and Equip 
Authority, but there is evidence that the materials and training provided to the nations 
that have received assistance have had a positive impact in select cases.   
Since the inception of Section 1206, key players such as the Secretaries of State 
and Defense, the Combatant Commanders, and members of Congress have attempted to 
give the authority the correct breadth and depth to optimize its effectiveness.  Since 
FY2006, the program has expanded both in dollars and scope.  However, some opponents 
object to this growth trend.  Poor coordination between the embassy teams, Combatant 
Commanders and their counterparts in Washington has resulted in the mismanagement of 
some Section 1206 projects.  Others are skeptical of Section 1206 authority because it 
represents a DOD program that infringes upon diplomatic functions.    
On the ground level, Section 1206 has impacted various countries and regions.  
Specifically, Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, and São Tome and Principe have received 
significant contributions from Section 1206.  Section 1206 contributions were targeted to 
help those countries address their security gaps.  Each has become more capable at 




Global Train and Equip Authority has been an asset to the U.S. during the Global 
War on Terror, filling gaps that existed in State Department programs that provide other 
types of security assistance.  More importantly, Section 1206 has created greater 
cooperation among many agencies that influence global security.  However, Section 1206 
is a short term solution to correcting the shortcomings of the FMF/FMS and IMET 
programs.  These programs need to be revamped to be able to react to the demands of 
today’s security environment while incorporating the lessons learned about agency 
cooperation from Section 1206.  Once that occurs, the authority and funding for the 
projects that Section 1206 is used should be the responsibility of the State Department.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Section 1206 could be further researched in the area of ground-level impact.  
There is limited documentation regarding the subject.  Researching this area is important 
because it examines whether countries are given assets for the specific reason of 
conducting counterterrorism operations, and if so, how those assets have impacted their 










Involved Project Description/Objectives 
Caribbean Basin:  Forward 





Provides interoperable communications and computers 
with training and technical support to establish a joint 
maritime command, control, and communications 
architecture to support counterterrorism operations 
Gulf of Guinea: Countering 





Establishes a Regional Maritime Awareness Capability 
through the use of commercial available equipment; 
promotes stability and enhances counterterrorism 
capabilities. 
Indonesia:  Securing 
Strategic Sea Lanes 
($18.4M) 
Indonesia 
Assists in developing an Integrated maritime 
Surveillance System to support maritime security in 






Helps the Lebanese Armed Forces bolster the 
government of Lebanon’s ability to exert control over its 






Helps develop integrated rotary wing assets capable of 
expediting the receipt, analysis, and dissemination of 
intelligence.  Facilitates the rapid planning and 
expedition of Pakistani counterterrorist special 
operations raids in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas and border region to fight terrorist and anti-
coalition militants. 
Sri Lanka:  Reducing 
Ungoverned Maritime 
Spaces ($10.9M) 
Sri Lanka Promotes the development of a Counterterrorism Maritime Security Capability. 
Thailand:  Securing 
Strategic Sea Lanes ($5.3M) Thailand 
Helps establish an intelligence fusion hub critically 
located on the Andaman Sea to support Royal Thai Navy 
operations and enhance counterterrorism capabilities. 
Trans-Sahara African 
Countries:  Securing the 







Helps develop a secure multinational information 
sharing network to share and store information 
effectively.  Enables countries to act on information that 
is essential to disrupt and attack terrorist networks, and 
conduct peace and security operations. 
Yemen:  Countering Cross-
Border Terrorist Activity 
($4.3M) 
Yemen 
Help increase the capability of the Yemeni Armed 
Forces to prevent cross-border arms trafficking and 
helps suppress terrorist activity. 
 Total $100.1M 
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APPENDIX B 
Section 1206 Fiscal Year 2007 Project Descriptions137 
 











Provide countries who have contributed 
personnel to coalition CT operations with the 
necessary equipment and training expected from 




Provide Bahrain with computers and link 




Provide 2 Mark V coastal patrol craft capable of 




Provide Caribbean partner nations with high 
speed vessels with communication and 
navigation systems to support rapid interdiction 




Provide soldier systems to build an Anti-




Provide Chad with equipment and training to 





Provide HF communication capability for 






Coastal surveillance stations equipped with radar 







Initiative Aviation assets and training for CT operations $18.000 
Indonesia 
Celebes Sea and 
Malacca Strait 
Network 
Provide real time high speed network capable of 
sharing a common operating picture within 
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Systems on naval vessels, radar centers, C&C 





Provide 8 Indonesian ships with systems 
providing common operating picture developed 







Repair parts for aviation assets and vehicles and 
small arms to improve operational mobility, 




Provide armed forces with a system capable of 
developing and sharing a common operating 










"Eyes in the 
Sky" 
Forward Looking Infrared Radar sites on the 
Malaysian coast to increase effectiveness of 
Multi-national "Eyes in the Sky" program to 




Provide equipment necessary to build an 
additional infantry company for Mauritania $4.500 
Mexico CT Training 
Mexican forces will be trained in urban warfare, 
forensics and marksmanship tactics, techniques 







Provide coastal nations with radar, electro-
optical, infrared and AIS sites for surveillance 
and communications equipment to monitor this 






Provide training to Trans-Sahara nations on use 
and sharing of intel in order to detect, monitor 




















Aviation night vision, systems (weapons, 
communication and night vision) for individual 
soldiers and ground units $5.200 
Pakistan Marines T&E 
Provide Marines with all weather interdiction 







Provide all weather interdiction capability--night 
vision devices, soldier systems, electronic 






Patrol aircraft with Forward Looking Infrared 






Helicopter patrols of southern coast night and 
offensive capabilities with machine guns, 
insertion capability, and night vision goggles $4.400 
Philippines 
HF Radios for 
Coast Watch 
Sough 
Provide radios for command centers, outposts, 






Provide 3 two-boat detachments along with  
support equipment to include communication, 






Communication capability and range with real 





Equipment and training to establish a small boat 
interdiction capability available day or night with 








Provide nations in this region with capabilities to 
support civilian populations during disasters and 
other civil-military operations. $3.400 
Yemen 




Provide border and interior patrol forces with 
training and equipment necessary for patrols to 





Provide the Kazakh Peacekeeping Brigade with 
necessary basic soldier equipment for coalition 
operations and training equipment expected from 
a NATO unit $19.300 











Section 1206 Fiscal Year 2008 Project Descriptions138 
 







Train forces in boat operations, diving, C&C and 
instruction techniques $2.000 
Bahrain 
Defense Force 
Special Ops T&E 
Provide special forces with T&E to include soldier 
systems and vehicles necessary to conduct CT ops in 









Provide Georgia with necessary equipment (training 









Initiative Provide training on border security $2.000 
Lebanon Special Ops T&E 
Equip special operations forces with soldier systems to 
include night vision devices and weapons to reduce 





Radars along coast of eastern Sabah and a system for 
developing/transmitting a single common operating 
picture to enhance detection and interdiction $9.900 
Pakistan SSG T&E 
Provide Pakistani Special Services Group with 
individual soldier equipment, basic electronic systems 




Provide a low-visibility and night time interdiction 
capability with small vessel equipped with necessary 









Provide surveillance and night vision equipment for 
individuals and aviation $10.000 
  Total $103.300
 
 
                                                 
138 Department of Defense.  Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Projects Summary (FY06-FY08). 
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Letter of Acceptance (LOA) Instructions and applicable notes for FY2007 Section 1206 
pseudo LOAs financed with FY2007 Operation and Maintenance funds are listed 
below.139 
 
Instructions for Preparing a Section 1206 of PL 109-364 Pseudo LOAs 
1.  Case Identifier. DSCA (Strategy Directorate) will assign a case identifier composed of country 
code (e.g. “B5”), Implementing Agency code of the DOD Component providing the support, and 
a case designator assigned by DSCA (Strategy Directorate). 
2.  Nickname Field.  The country/organization receiving the support and the pseudo case authority 
and the text “(Non-FMS)” (e.g., Bandaria, PL 109-364, Sec 1206 (Non-FMS)) are identified in 
the “nickname” field on the pseudo LOA. 
3.  Purchaser’s Reference Field.  Included the following statement below in the Purchaser’s 
Reference Field of the Customer Request: 
“Based on the written request provided by the Section 1206 of PL 109-364 
Program Originator [insert Program Originator’s name (e.g., Department of State, 
Combatant Commands, etc.)] to Defense Security Cooperation Agency, dated 
[insert date of written request].  The legal authority is Section 1206 of PL 109-
364. See note [insert LOA note number] for additional information.” 
4.  Terms of Sale Field.  The Term of Sale for Section 1206 pseudo LOAs is Cash with 
Acceptance. 
5.  Authority Field.  Public Law 109-364. 
6.  Authority Fiscal Year.  2007. 
7.  Purchaser Signature Field (Customer Signatory Name on Distribution Tab of Case Detail).  
Insert the authority and the statement that no purchaser signature is required (e.g., Section 1206, 
PL 109-364 (Non-FMS – No Purchaser Signature Required)). 
8.  Purchaser Mailing Address.  Insert “Department of Defense.” 
9.  MASL.  Use valid existing MASLs for items being transferred or contact DSCA to approve 
new MASLs, if required. 
10.  Delivery Term Code.  For Section 1206 of PL 109-364 pseudo LOAs, use the Delivery Term 
Code (DTC) for Defense Transportation System that will provide shipment all the way into 
recipient country.  This is generally accomplished through DTC 7, unless DTC 9 suffices. 
 
                                                 
139 Defense Security Cooperation Agency.  Assignment of Code “B5” for National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364), Section 1206—Security Assistance 
Management Manual (SAMM) E-Change 73 (DSCA Policy 07-10).  March 2, 2007. 
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